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Abstract
This short paper investigates the consequences of voters identifying with
special interest groups in a spatial model of electoral competition. We show
that, by effectively coordinating voting behavior, identification with interest
groups leads to an increase in the size of the winning set, that is, the set of policy
platforms for the challenger that will defeat the incumbent. Consequently, our
paper points at a novel process through which interest groups can enhance the
electoral chances of a challenger.
Keywords: Spatial voting models, electoral competition, winning set, interest
groups.
JEL classification code: D71; D72.
1 Introduction
Special interest groups play an important role in political decision making (Richard-
son, 1994, Potters and Sloof, 1996, Congleton, Hillman, and Konrad, 2008). Regard-
ing electoral competition - the focus of this study - a substantial number of theoretical
studies have appeared over the last two decades trying to explain the influence of in-
terest groups through campaign contributions, strategic information transmission,
and the like (for surveys, see Austen-Smith 1994, Grossman and Helpman, 2001,
van Winden, 2003, Prat, 2006). Thus far, however, the impact of interest groups
on the political preferences and voting behavior of voters through the sociopsycho-
logical mechanism of identification has been neglected. This is in line with Akerlof
and Kranton’s (2000) more general observation that identity is “a missing motivation
in economists’ current description of organizations” (op. cit., p.10). Their seminal
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analysis suggests that this neglect is an important shortcoming of the present state
of the art. Identity refers to a person’s social category and self-image (e.g. being
‘leftist’, ‘rightist’, ‘green’, or ‘red’) and it: “describes gains and losses in utility from
behavior that conforms or departs from the norms for particular social categories in
particular situations” (op. cit., p.12). Identification with an organization means that
the goals of that organization become important to the self, inducing people to behave
in concert with these goals, even if social sanctions on deviant behavior are absent.
To be politically effective, an important goal of a special interest group involved in
electoral competition is the coordination of the voting behavior of its supporters1
on the political issue that the group stands for.2 For voters concerned about existing
policies, supporting an interest group on an issue that is of particular concern to them
seems a natural and even ‘rational’ thing to do in an environment that is complicated
and where a single vote has (generally) no clout. Since negative experiences appear
to have a relatively stronger impact on behavior (see e.g. Baumeister et al. 2001, and
Offerman, 2002) one may arguably expect that especially dissatisfied and frustrated
voters will try to link up with others feeling similarly. Interest groups can offer such
voters a focal mechanism to express their concerns in a cost-effective way, through
the alignment of voting behavior. The literature on identity namely suggests that
those identifying with an interest group will, to a certain extent, give priority to the
issue promoted by this group, which may imply a deviation from self-interest due to
conformity effects (Shayo, 2009). Consequently, the issue at stake may gain more
political clout than predicted by existing models of electoral competition. Moreover,
there is plenty of empirical evidence suggesting that group membership affects pref-
erences. Experiments have shown that even minimal groups, defined by an arbitrary
color label like yellow or blue and with random assignment of individuals, affect be-
havior (Brewer, 1979, Tajfel and Turner, 1986, Schram and Sonnemans, 1996). In
fact, the psychological theory of cognitive dissonance predicts that already the deci-
sion to join a group will tend to make the issues represented by that group relatively
more attractive (Festinger and Aronson, 1968). Akerlof and Kranton (2000) have
shown for various types of economic interactions that taking into account the phe-
nomenon of identification — that is, incorporating identity into the utility function —
substantively changes the conclusions of previous economic analyses. The aim of this
paper is to theoretically investigate the consequences of identification in a political
economic context, using a standard spatial model of electoral competition (see e.g.
Enelow and Hinich, 1984).
More specifically, our research question concerns the differential impact of the
presence of interest groups on electoral competition if voters can support and identify
with an interest group that furthers an issue of importance to them. Making the
usual assumption of (weighted) Euclidean distance preferences in the absence of in-
terest groups, essentially, identification in this context implies that voters will attach
1Note that identification with an interest group need not necessarily imply (registered) member-
ship of that group. People may be supportive of an interest group’s objectives without becoming a
formal member. In this paper we will not distinguish between these two forms.
2For an empirical illustration, see Chong (1991, p.236): “Black organizations and institutions
helped to coordinate the preferences and actions of those who supported the civil rights movement.”
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extra weight or priority to the issue represented by the interest group. Furthermore,
it will be assumed that the support of an interest group (and, thus, identification) is
positively related with the level of dissatisfaction with the incumbent’s policy. This
assumption is supported by the ample evidence on the importance of discontent and
frustration for collective action (see e.g. Kernell, 1977, Lau, 1982, Chong, 1991,
Romer, 1996, Javeline, 2003). Identification based coordination of voting behavior
then produces our main result which relates to the winning set, i.e. the set of policy
platforms with which a challenger can defeat a given incumbent’s policy position.
Assuming for tractability a two-dimensional issue space and a uniform distribution
of the voters ideal points over this space, we are able to show that the introduc-
tion of interest groups in this environment typically increases the winning set. Our
demonstration provides a theoretical foundation for a similar observation made by
Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden (2006) on the basis of simulations with a more
complex computational model. This result is particularly important if one takes into
account that in practice political parties do not have complete information about
voting behavior, urging them to use instruments like polls for acquiring information
(see Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden, 2006). Our result then suggests that in the
presence of interest groups, it will be easier for the challenger to find a position de-
feating the incumbent. Or, put differently, the challenger’s probability of winning
the election will be enhanced by interest groups. As a further consequence, election
outcomes may become more volatile.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the spatial compe-
tition model with interest groups and our main result. The proof of the main result
is outlined in Section 3, whereas the formal proofs of the results used there are rel-
egated to the Appendix. Section 4 concludes with a further discussion of relevance
and implications.
2 Spatial competition and interest groups
Two political parties, an incumbent and a challenger, are assumed to compete for
votes by selecting certain policy platforms. Platforms are represented as points in an
issue space. We take this issue space to be continuous and equal to X = B(O,K) ⊂
IR2, that is, political parties can choose platforms on two dimensions from an open
ball with center at the origin O = (0, 0) and radius K > 0.3 There is a continuum of
voters where each voter j is characterized by an ideal point xj∈X and an issue weight
vector or profile sj ∈ S2 where S = {s1, s2, . . . , sr}, with s = s1 < s2 < . . . < sr = s.
Let4 s > 0 and, without loss of generality, s = 1. Suppose voters’ ideal points are
uniformly distributed over X and voters’ weights are independently and identically
distributed (and also independently from voters’ ideal points) according to some
3We will return to this assumption in Section 4.
4As will become clear when we introduce interest groups, voters with weight 0 on one of the
issues do not change their voting behavior when these interest groups enter the scene. Taking s > 0
is therefore an innocuous assumption. Moreover, the alternative assumption that strengths are
continuously distributed on [s, s] would lead to the same results.
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distribution on S.5 A voter’s utility with respect to a certain policy outcome y∈X
is given by the negative of the (weighted) Euclidean distance between this policy
outcome and the voter’s ideal point. Formally, utility for voter j of policy outcome y
is given by6
uj (y) = −
°°xj − y°°2sj , (1)
where kxj − yk2sj ≡ sj1
¡
xj1 − y1
¢2
+ sj2
¡
xj2 − y2
¢2
.
Let y be the given position of the incumbent.7 In the absence of interest groups
voters will vote for that candidate whose position will give him or her the highest
utility according to (1). In case of a tie the voter will randomize, with equal proba-
bility, between the candidates. Now define by W (y) ⊂ X the set of policy platforms
z that are expected to attract (strictly) more votes than the incumbent’s platform y.
Clearly, the challenger’s objective is to select a policy platform from W (y). Notice
that by definition y /∈ W (y) since a voter is indifferent between a challenger and
the incumbent with identical policy platforms. An equilibrium point of the electoral
competition game is defined as a platform y∗ for which the winning set is empty, i.e.
W (y∗) = ∅. The uniform distribution of voters’ ideal points over the issue space X
implies that in our framework such an equilibrium point will indeed exist (cf. Plott,
1967) and is in fact given by the origin (this statement will be made more precise in
Proposition 2 in Section 3).8 By W (y; s) we will denote the set of policy platforms
defeating the incumbent’s platform y in the special case where all voters have weight
vector s.
The next step is to incorporate interest groups in the model. We model a special
interest group as being interested in the policy outcome with respect to only one of
the two issues. Moreover, for tractability, we are going to investigate the situation
where for every position on an issue voters can join an interest group and where all
dissatisfied voters join an interest group.9 Before we describe how voting behavior is
coordinated by the interest groups let us first determine how individual voters decide
which interest group to join. An individual voter with ideal position x = (x1, x2) is a
potential member of two interest groups, the interest group on the first issue located
at position x1 and the interest group on the second issue located at position x2.
Which interest group this voter joins depends upon the incumbent’s position and the
5That is, for all r, t ∈ S and all v, w ∈ X we assume that Pr {s = (r, t)} = Pr {s1 = r}Pr {s2 = t}
and Pr {s = (r, t) |x = v} = Pr {s = (r, t) |x = w}.
6Notice that, following Enelow and Hinich (1984), we assume that preferences are separable. Our
formulation implies that the indifference curves are ellipses with horizontal and vertical axes.
7It is realistic to assume that the challenger is more flexible in choosing a platform, since (s)he
cannot be held responsible for the existing policy (see e.g. Kramer, 1977, and Kollman, Miller, and
Page, 1992). For tractability, we use an idealization here.
8Note however, that this is not necessarily the case for finite samples of voters (see Tovey, 2010,
for a discussion of distributional analysis of spatial voting models).
9Thus, there are many interest groups and an interest group exists at every position of each issue.
Every voter has the possibility to join one of two of those interest groups, namely the interest group
that has the same position as him/her on the first issue, or that interest group that has the same
position as him/her on the second issue. As our focus is on the consequences of identification we
keep this part of the model as simple as possible. (Note that our assumption does not imply that
there is a seperate interest group for each position in the issue space, which would obviously make
the concept void.)
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weights the voter attaches to the two issues. We assume that voters are more inclined
to support an interest group on a particular issue the more distant the incumbent’s
policy position is from their own position on that issue (see the Introduction).10 Of
course, the weight a voter attaches to the issues also comes into play. Hence we
assume that, given the incumbent policy platform y, a voter decides to support the
interest group on the issue i with the largest positive value of si (xi − yi)2, where
i ∈ {1, 2}.11 In this way the population of voters is divided over the different interest
groups. Now consider the interest group located at position x1 on the first issue.
Identification with the interest group’s stance (see the Introduction) stimulates its
members, who take the same position on the first issue, to vote for that political
candidate which is closest to the interest group on this issue. Thus, if y and z are
the policy platforms of the two political parties, then identification is formalized as
inducing a member of this interest group to vote for the first party according to the
following decision rule12
vote for y if
⎧
⎨
⎩
|y1 − x1| < |z1 − x1|
|y1 − x1| = |z1 − x1| and |y2 − x2| < |z2 − x2|
and similarly for the second party. Naturally, we will assume that the voter votes with
probability 1
2
for either policy platform if |y − x| = |z − x|. A similar decision rule
holds for members of interest groups on the other issue. The introduction of interest
groups thus effectively is equivalent with a change in the structure of voter prefer-
ences. Similar toW (y) we denote byW I (y) the set of policy platforms defeating the
incumbent’s platform y when interest groups are present.
The aim of this paper is to investigate the consequences of the introduction of
interest groups for the winning sets given an incumbent’s position y, i.e. the areas of
the winning sets denoted by |W (y)| and ¯¯W I (y)¯¯. Our main result is
Theorem 1 Let s > 0 be given. Denote
Ψ (s) = min
(
2 (ϕ (s))
3
2
1 + (ϕ (s))3
,
1p
1 + 4
√
sϕ (s)
)
, (2)
where ϕ (s) = 1+ 1s . Then for all y ∈ B(O,Ψ (s)K)\ {O} the area of the winning set
increases in the presence of interest groups.
This result shows that for all incumbent positions y within a prespecified cir-
cle within the issue space, the winning set increases in the presence of the interest
10For models of interest group formation using a similar approach but applied to, respectively,
taxation and informative lobbying, see Sadiraj, Tuinstra, and van Winden (2005, 2006).
11We assume that a voter with s1 (x1 − y1)2 = s2 (x2 − y2)2 with probability 12 chooses to join
the interest group on issue 1 and otherwise chooses the interest group on issue 2.
12Effectively, this means that identification leads voters to change their issue weight vector from s ∈
S2 to either (1, 0) or (0, 1). Put differently, decisions of interest group members can be represented
by lexicographic preferences, instead of by weighted Euclidean distance. This is the sense in which
voters identifying with an interest group conform to the issue important to that group.
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Figure 1: Construction of the winning set for the benchmark model. Left panel shows
how W (y; s) can be constructed (part 2 of Proposition 2), the right panel illustrates
part 3 of Proposition 2.
groups. Note that this circle is shrinking as s approaches 0 and that the radius of
this circle goes to 1
3
K as s approaches 1. For an intermediate value of s = 1
2
, we have
Ψ
¡
1
2
¢
K =
¡
1 + 6
√
2
¢− 1
2 K ≈ 0.325K, which is rather close to 1
3
K already. Notice
that if the incumbent’s position falls outside the region specified by Theorem 1, i.e.
the incumbent platform is at least a distance Ψ (s)K away from the origin, which is
the equilibrium point, the winning set for the challenger is relatively large anyway,
whether interest groups are present or not.
3 Outline of the proof of the Theorem
In this section we will outline the proof of Theorem 1 in a number of intuitive steps.
Formal and rigorous proofs of these different steps are relegated to the appendix. It
will be convenient to define, for given v, w ∈ IR2 and c ∈ S2
Ec (v, w) =
©
x ∈ IR2 : kx− vk2c < kw − vk2c
ª
.
Hence Ec (v, w) contains all the points inside an ellipse, which is centered at the point
v, and going through the point w. The area of this ellipse equals π kw − vk2c /
√
c1c2.
First we consider the benchmark model, i.e. electoral competition between polit-
ical parties in the absence of interest groups. We have the following result.
Proposition 2 Assume voters’ ideal positions are independently (across issues and
across voters) drawn from the uniform distribution on X and that voters’ weights on
each issue are independently drawn from a distribution on S and are uncorrelated
with each other and with the ideal positions. Let y be the platform of the incumbent
and let C = {(s, 1) , (1, s)}. Then
6
1. W (O) = ∅,
2. W (y; s) = Es (O, y),
3. ∀y ∈ X\{O} ,W (y) ⊂
[
c∈C
Ec(O, y) and |W (y)| ≤ π kyk2 ϕ (s)√s.
This result is illustrated in Figure 1. Observe that any line through the origin
O divides the issue space X into two regions which are equally large. Therefore,
since ideal points are symmetrically (and uniformly) distributed over the issue space,
no other platform will be able to defeat the origin (the origin here corresponds to
the position of the generalized median voter, see Hoyer and Mayer, 1974). Now
consider an arbitrary position z in Es (O, y) (see the left panel of Figure 1). The line
l∗s presents all positions x such that all voters with weight vector s and ideal point x
are indifferent between z and y. Therefore all voters with weight vector s and an ideal
point below l∗s will vote for z and it is then easily seen that the majority of voters with
that profile will indeed vote for z (basically, since voters with ideal point O will vote
for z). This argument holds if and only if z is an element of Es (O, y) and therefore
W (y; s) = Es (O, y). Moreover, for all s ∈ S2 we have Es (O, y) ⊂
[
c∈C
Ec (O, y) (see
the right panel of Figure 1), which implies W (y) ⊂
[
c∈C
Ec (O, y). With some tedious
but straightforward computations one can then derive the upper bound from part 3
of Proposition 2.
Let us now turn to the model with interest groups. We will derive a lower bound
for the size of the winning set in the model with interest groups in a number of steps.
The results are driven by the fact that decisions of interest group members can now be
represented by lexicographic preferences, instead of by weighted Euclidean distance.
Consider all voters with a certain weight vector s ∈ S2. Consider a given position y
of the incumbent. From now on we will, without loss of generality, assume y1 ≥ 0
and y2 ≥ 0. In order to determine the sizes of the interest groups take the two lines
l− and l+, which go through y with slopes −
q
s1
s2
and
q
s1
s2
, respectively. These two
lines demarcate four regions in the issue space (see Figure 2), which we denote as
I (below y), II (above y), III (to the right of y) and IV (to the left of y). For
each of the regions it is easy to determine whether voters with an ideal point in that
region (and with weight vector s) will join an interest group on the first issue or one
on the second issue. The following lemma (the proof of which is left to the reader)
summarizes this.
Lemma 3 Consider voter j with ideal point x and weight vector s.
i) If x ∈ I ∪ II then voter j joins the interest group on the second issue.
ii) If x ∈ III ∪ IV then voter j joins the interest group on the first issue.
Figure 2 also illustrates the lines ll− and ll+, which pass through the origin O and
lie parallel to l− and l+, and the regions S+ (y; s) and S− (y; s) which lie between l+
7
Figure 2: Illustration of the different regions needed for determining the area of the
winning set for the interest group model. The point y corresponds to the incumbent’s
position. The lines l− and l+ through y divide the issue space in four regions: regions
I and II (below and above y respectively, containing ideal positions of voters joining
interest groups on the second issue, see Lemma 3) and the regions III and IV (to the
right and to the left of y, respectively, containing the ideal positions of voters joining
interest groups on the first issue). The shaded region between l− and ll− (between l+
and ll+) corresponds to S− (y; s) (S+ (y; s)).
and ll+ and between l− and ll−, respectively. The significance of these two regions
will become evident shortly.
We are now ready to prove our main results. First, in Proposition 4 we character-
ize, given the incumbent’s position y 6= 0 and a weight vector s, the set of positions
for the challenger that attract more than half of the voters with that weight vector.
Proposition 5 then looks at the intersection of all these sets over different weight
vectors, in order to find a lower bound for
¯¯
W I (y)
¯¯
. Finally, comparing this lower
bound with the upper bound for |W (y)| that was found in Proposition 2, Theorem
1 is proven.
Proposition 4 In the presence of interest groups any element of the set A (y; s)
is supported by more than half of the voters with weight vector s, where A (y; s) =
A− (y; s) ∪A+ (y; s) and
A− (y; s) = {z : z1 < y1, z2 < y2} ∩ Es (y, w−) ∩X ,
A+ (y; s) = {z : z1 < y1, z2 ≥ y2} ∩ Es (y,w+) ∩X .
where w∗, ∗ ∈ {−,+} satisfies ky − w∗k2s = 4
√
s1s2 |S∗ (y; s)| .
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Figure 3: Illustration of Proposition 4. The left panel shows how the set A−(y; s) can
be constructed, the right panel show what the sets A−(y; s) and A+(y; s) look like.
This proposition tells us that the area of S− (y; s) (or S+ (y; s)) defines a region
A− (y; s) (or A+ (y; s)), which is part of an ellipse and has the property that all
positions within this region defeat the incumbent for the given weight profile. The
proof of this proposition can be illustrated by the left panel in Figure 3. Pick an
arbitrary z < y and denote by M the midpoint of the line connecting z with the
incumbent’s position y. Now draw a vertical and a horizontal line through M . The
intersections of these lines with l+ and l− define two triangles, 41 and 42. By
construction (see Lemma 3) all voters with weight profile s and an ideal point below
l− will vote for z, except those voters with ideal points in one of the two triangles.
Hence we have to determine for which positions z the area of the associated triangles
is not too large. In fact, from Figure 2 it follows that the area below l− can be
described as |l− (O)| = 12 |X | + |S− (y; s)|. Moreover, the area corresponding to the
voters that cast their vote for the incumbent is given by |X |− (|l− (O)|− |41 +42|).
Using the expression for |l− (O)| we find that the challenger wins the election when
|41 +42| < |S− (y; s)|. This inequality holds exactly for all z ∈ A− (y; s). A similar
argument can be made for A+ (y; s). The sets A− (y; s) and A+ (y; s) are illustrated
in the right panel of Figure 3.
The set A (y; s) can be constructed for any weight profile s. Clearly, a policy
position z which lies in the intersection ∩sA (y; s) of these sets has the property that
for each possible weight profile a majority of the voters with this profile will vote for
that policy position z. Any element of this set will therefore belong to the winning
set W I (y) and the area of this intersection then gives a lower bound for
¯¯
W I (y)
¯¯
.
The next proposition deals with this intersection and a lower bound for its area, for
the case with y1 > 0 and y2 > 0. For the other configurations of y a similar result
can be obtained.
Proposition 5 Consider y1 > 0 and y2 > 0. Let Ry = 2
p
S(y)
√
s, where S (y) =
9
inf {|S− (y; s)| : s1, s2 ∈ S}.
1. B = B (y,Ry) ∩ {z ∈ X : zi < yi, i = 1, 2} ⊂ ∩sA (y; s) ;
2. S(y) ≥
µ
K +
q
K2 − kyk2
¶
(|y1|+|y2|)√
ϕ(s)
.
We now have determined an upper bound for the area of the winning set in the
absence of interest groups (Proposition 2) and a lower bound for the area of the
winning set in the presence of interest groups (Proposition 5). Our main theorem
then simply follows from comparing these two bounds.
Sketch of the proof of Theorem 1. From Proposition 2, part 3 we find that
|W (y)| ≤ π kyk2 ϕ (s)√s.
Moreover, Proposition 5 implicitly gives a lower bound for
¯¯
W I (y)
¯¯
. Comparing the
two, we find that a sufficient condition for
¯¯
W I (y)
¯¯
> |W (y)| is that y belongs to
B(O,Ψ (s)K)\ {O}, where
Ψ (s) = min
(
2 (ϕ (s))
3
2
1 + (ϕ (s))3
,
1p
1 + 4ϕ (s)
√
s
)
.
4 Concluding remarks
In this short paper we have shown that the introduction of interest groups into a spa-
tial voting model of electoral competition between two political parties will typically
increase the winning set for the challenger. Since in mass elections candidates or
political parties will in general lack information concerning the distribution of voter
preferences, it can be quite difficult to find winning positions. This paper suggests
that winning sets for the challenger will increase in the presence of interest groups,
thereby increasing the probability of winning for the challenger and making it harder
to locate an equilibrium point if it exists. This effect, which is driven by the (empir-
ically plausible) assumption that interest group membership is positively related to
the discontent with the incumbent’s policy on the relevant issue has, to our knowl-
edge, never been shown before. The effect is confirmed in a simulation study by
Sadiraj, Tuinstra and van Winden (2006). Moreover, this simulation study indicates
that, because of the increase in the winning set in the presence of interest groups,
separation between policy platforms increases and the rate of convergence of policy
platforms to the equilibrium point decreases.
The model we have chosen to present our main result is, of course, highly stylized.
Two final remarks are in order here. First, as can be seen from Section 3, we have
been quite conservative in providing upper and lower bounds of the relevant areas.
We therefore expect that our main result holds for a significantly larger set than the
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one specified by Theorem 1. Secondly, for matters of exposition we chose as issue
space a ball around the origin, where a rectangular issue space is more common in the
literature. Actually, the issue space might be larger than this ball. A distribution of
voter preferences over for example a square or rectangle would substantively give the
same results, but would lead to a cumbersome written proof. The present assump-
tion is also motivated by the observation that voters typically do not take extreme
positions on all issues. What the precise effect of interest groups will be under a
more general specification of the (dimension of the) issue space, the distribution of
ideal points and the structure of voter preferences or in the absence of an equilibrium
point is left for future research. Note however that the result presented here holds
for any distribution of strengths, provided that this distribution is independent of the
ideal points. The main message here is that (through identification) interest groups
will have an impact on voting behavior and thereby influence the political decision
making process, even apart from their influence on the latter through lobbying, cam-
paign contributions or endorsements, which are the channels studied in the existing
political economic literature on interest groups.
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A Proofs
This appendix contains formal proofs for the results in Section 3.
Proof of Proposition 2.
1. By symmetry, any line through the origin O divides the issue space X into two
regions which are equally large. The uniform distribution then implies the same
expected number of voters on either side of such a line. Therefore the origin
corresponds to the position of the generalized median voter and no position will
strictly defeat it. Hence W (O) = ∅.
2. Without loss of generality we assume y1 ≥ y2 > 0. Consider an arbitrary policy
position z, with zi ≤ yi, i = 1, 2. We want to determine under which conditions
z ∈ W (y). Let us first determine all positions x∗ such that voters with the
considered weight profile s are indifferent between z and y. These positions x∗
have to satisfy
ky − x∗k2s = kz − x∗k2s .
Solving for x∗2 is straightforward and gives
x∗2 =
−2s1 (y1 − z1)x∗1 + kyk2s − kzk2s
2s2 (y2 − z2)
. (3)
Let us denote the line defined by (3) as l∗s . Clearly, l∗s separates the issue space
into two regions and all voters in the region below and to the left of l∗s vote
for the challenger, if it selects position z. Now suppose l∗s cuts the vertical axis
at some positive value. Then we can draw a line that goes through O and
that lies parallel to l∗s . This line through O divides X into two equal regions,
implying that the region lying below and to the left of l∗s will be larger than the
region above and to the right of l∗s . Therefore, the challenger will win at z if l∗s
intersects the vertical axis at some positive value. This condition reduces to
kyk2s − kzk2s > 0,
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which defines the ellipse given in the proposition. In a similar fashion the same
condition can be derived for positions z with z1 ≤ y1 and z2 > y2 and for
positions z with z1 > y1 and z2 ≤ y2. It should be clear that positions z with
z1 ≥ y1 and z2 ≥ y2 never defeat the incumbent.
3. First, we show that W (y) ⊂
[
c∈C
Ec (O, y) . A sufficient condition for this to be
true is ∪sEs (O, y) ⊂ ∪cEc (O, y).
Let x ∈ ∪sEs (O, y). Hence, x ∈ Es (O, y) for some s1, s2 ∈ S and therefore
kxk2s < kyk2s, or equivalently¡
x21 − y21
¢
<
s2
s1
¡
y22 − x22
¢
.
Note that s ≤ s2s1 ≤
1
s , for all s1, s2 ∈ S. If |x2| ≤ |y2|, then¡
x21 − y21
¢
<
s2
s1
¡
y22 − x22
¢
≤ 1
s
¡
y22 − x22
¢
⇐⇒ sx21 + x22 ≤ sy21 + y22
and therefore x ∈ Ec (O, y) with c = (s, 1). On the other hand, if |x2| > |y2| we
have ¡
x21 − y21
¢
<
s2
s1
¡
y22 − x22
¢
≤ s
¡
y22 − x22
¢
,
and therefore x ∈ Ec (O, y) with c = (1, s).
Second, we calculate the area of
[
c∈C
Ec (O, y). Recall that the area of Ec (O, y)
is given by π kyk
2
c√
c1c2
and therefore we have¯¯¯¯
¯[
c∈C
Ec (O, y)
¯¯¯¯
¯ ≤X
c∈C
π
kyk2c√
c1c2
=
π
√
s
³
kyk2(s,1) + kyk2(1,s)
´
= πϕ (s)
√
s kyk2
Hence,
|W (y)| ≤
¯¯¯¯
¯[
c∈C
Ec (O, y)
¯¯¯¯
¯ ≤ πϕ (s)√s kyk2 .
Proof of Proposition 4. Consider a position z ∈ A− (y; s). Denote by M =
(M1,M2) =
¡y1+z1
2
, y2+z2
2
¢
the midpoint of the line connecting z with the incumbent’s
position y. Now draw a vertical and a horizontal line through M and consider the
intersections of these lines with l+ and l−. Denote these intersections by i∗, where
∗ ∈ {+,−} and i ∈ {1, 2}. Hence 1+ (1−) is the intersection between the vertical line
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through M and l+ (l−) and 2+ (2−) is the intersection between the horizontal line
throughM and l+ (l−). Now consider the subspace L ≡ (l− (O)− (1−1+2+2−1−))∩X .
From Lemma 3 we know that all voters in I join the interest group on the second issue
and all voters in IV join the interest group on the first issue. For the voters in I∩L we
have
¯¯
xj2 − z2
¯¯
<
¯¯
xj2 − y2
¯¯
and for all voters in IV ∩L we have ¯¯xj1 − z1¯¯ < ¯¯xj1 − y1¯¯.
This proves that the challenger at position z gets votes from voters with ideal positions
in L. Hence it gets more than half of the votes if
|S−| > |1−1+2+2−1−|
since |S−| = |l− (O)|− 12 |X |.
First, denote 41 the triangle y1+1− and 42 the triangle y2+2− and note that
|(1−1+2+2−1−) ∩X| ≤ |41|+ |42|
=
r
s1
s2
(y1 −M1)2 +
r
s2
s1
(y2 −M2)2
=
1
4
r
s1
s2
(y1 − z1)2 +
1
4
r
s2
s1
(y2 − z2)2
≤ |S−|
The first inequality follows from the fact that some parts of the triangles 4i, i = 1, 2
might not be in X , the first equal sign follows from computation of the surface of the
two triangles, the second equality follows from the definition of the midpoint M and
the final step follows from the fact that z ∈ A− (y; s). A similar reasoning holds for
A+ (y; s). Thus, it is shown that all positions z ∈ A (y; s) are expected to defeat the
incumbent.
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Proof of Proposition 5.
1. First, we show that
B ⊂ ∩sA (y; s)
Indeed, let x ∈ B i.e. xi < yi and
kx− yk2 ≤ R2y = 4S
√
s
Thus , ∀s ∈ S2 and c =
³
1
4
q
s1
s2
, 1
4
q
s2
s1
´
kx− yk2c ≤
1
4
r
1
s
kx− yk2
≤ 1
4
r
1
s
4S
√
s
≤ |S− (y; s)|
and therefore, x ∈ A− (y; s) ⊂ A (y; s) .
2. The next step consists of deriving a lower bound for the radius of B. First,
let d (O, l+) (d (O, l−)) correspond to the distance of the origin from the line l+
(l−), i.e.
d (O, l+) = min {kxk : x ∈ l+} .
For the case we are considering (y1 > 0 and y2 > 0), let h (y; s) = d (O, l−)
(which means that we are focussing on A− (y; s)). For all s ∈ S2, one has
|S− (y, s)| = 2
Z h(y;s)
0
√
K2 − z2dz
=
h
z
√
K2 − z2 +K2 arcsin z
K
ih(y;s)
0
= h (y; s)
q
K2 − h (y; s)2 +K2 arcsin h (y; s)
K
.
By definition we have h (y; s) ≤ kyk ≤ K. Furthermore, arcsinx > x for all
x ∈ (0, 1]. Using these properties we find
|S− (y, s)| ≥ h(y)
µq
K2 − kyk2 +K
¶
,
where h (y) = infs1,s2∈S h (y; s). Finally, since s ≤ min {s1/s2, s2/s1} and there-
fore
√s√
1+s ≤ min
n √
s1√
s1+s2
,
√
s2√
s1+s2
o
, we have
h (y; s) =
√
s1 |y1|+√s2 |y2|√
s1 + s2
≥
√
s√
1 + s
(|y1|+ |y2|)
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which implies h(y) ≥
√s(|y1|+|y2|)√
1+s . Using ϕ(s) = 1 + 1/s one now has
|S− (y; s)| ≥
p
1/ϕ(s)
µq
K2 − kyk2 +K
¶
(|y1|+ |y2|)
Proof of Theorem 1. Let s be given. From Proposition 2 we know that
|W (y)| ≤ π kyk2√sϕ(s).
From Proposition 5 we know that all positions z in B
¡
y, 2
p√
s |S|¢, with z1 < y1
and z2 < y2 are contained in W I (y). Furthermore we found that
|S− (y, s)| ≥ S(y) ≥
p
1/ϕ(s)
µ
K +
q
K2 − kyk2
¶
(|y1|+ |y2|) .
If this area lies in X we know that it presents a lower bound for ¯¯W I (y)¯¯. This does
not necessarily have to be the case. Let us first compute the two points that have
one of the coordinates equivalent with the point y but that lie on the border of X .
These points are
³
y1,
p
K2 − y21
´
and
³p
K2 − y22, y2
´
. Now consider the following
ball B (y, r) where r = min
n
|y1|+
p
K2 − y22, |y2|+
p
K2 − y21
o
. One fourth of this
ball lies in X completely. Therefore there are two possibilities. This fourth part of
the ball contains A− or is contained in A−. So we have to take the minimum of the
two lower bounds as a lower bound for
¯¯
W I (y)
¯¯
. Consider the first case. Then
¯¯
W I (y)
¯¯
≥ π
p
s/ϕ (s)
µ
K +
q
K2 − kyk2
¶
(|y1|+ |y2|)
and
|W (y)| < π kyk2√sϕ (s)
So we find that, in the presence of interest groups, the size of the winning set is
expected to increase for all y satisfying
¯¯
W I (y)
¯¯
≥ |W (y)| or
π
p
s/ϕ(s)
µ
K +
q
K2 − kyk2
¶
(|y1|+ |y2|) > π kyk2√sϕ (s)
Using |y1|+ |y2| ≥ kyk, and rewriting we find that for all y satisfying
kyk ≤ 2 (ϕ (s))
3
2
1 + (ϕ (s))3
K
our property holds. DefiningD1 ≡ 2(ϕ(s))
3
2
1+(ϕ(s))3
K, the property holds for all y ∈ B (0, D1).
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Now consider the second case with¯¯
W I (y)
¯¯
≥ π
4
µ
min
½
|y1|+
q
K2 − y22, |y2|+
q
K2 − y21
¾¶2
.
Suppose, without loss of generality, that |y1| +
p
K2 − y22 ≤ |y2| +
p
K2 − y21. We
look for kyk such that
π
4
µ
|y1|+
q
K2 − y22
¶2
≥ π kyk2√sϕ (s) .
Again, we will try to derive a condition on kyk2. Using 0 ≤ |y2|2 ≤ kyk2, we get
|y1|2 +K2 − y22 + 2 |y1|
q
K2 − y22 ≥ K2 − kyk2 ≥ 4 kyk2 ϕ (s)
√
s
or
kyk2 ≤ K
2
1 + 4ϕ (s)
√
s
That is, for all y ∈ B (0,D2), with D2 ≡ K√
1+4ϕ(s)√s
. This concludes the proof of
Theorem 1.
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